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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO

BEDARD and MUSSER, an Idaho
partnership, and BOISE HOLLOW LAND
HOLDINGS, RLLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Supreme Court Docket No. 44171-2016
Ada County No. CV-2015-10297

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
CITY OF BOISE CITY, a body politic
corporate of the State of Idaho,
Defendant-Respondent.
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Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth
Judicial District for the County of Ada
Honorable Jonathan Medema, District Judge, Presiding

Terry C. Copple, Esq.
Michael E. Band, Esq.
Davison, Copple, Copple & Copple, LLP
P.O. Box 1583
Boise, Idaho 83701
Attorneys.for Plaint[ffs-Appellants
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Abigail R. Germaine, Esq.
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A.

Tee effectively conveyed a permanent easement to
Vancroft because [l] Vancroft, as fee title owner Lot 1,
consented to its being subject to a permanent easement, and
[2] V ancroft never held concurrent unity of possession and
title with respect to Lot 1 and Lot 4. The permanent
easement was not subsequently extinguished by the
termination of the lease because at no point has there been
concurrence of the common law unities.

16

B.

The City should be estopped from denying the existence of
the easement because when it accepted the Deed of Gift it
assumed and became bound to the known obligations and
duties appurtenant to Lot 1, including the easement and the
Permanent Easement Agreement

C.

The plain language of the Permanent Easement Agreement
provides Boise Hollow the right to expand the road to meet
ACHD's specifications and requirements .................................................... 31
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Nature of the Case
The parties to

case are successors-in-interest to

1

1

which purported to grant an access easement across land 1
now owned by Defendant-Respondent City of Boise (the "City") to an adjacent 63-acre parce1 2
owned by Plaintiff-Appellant Boise Hollow Land Holdings, RLLP ("Boise Hollow"). This case
concerns the interpretation of the Permanent Easement Agreement.

It is Boise Hollow' s position that the plain language of the Permanent Easement
Agreement permits Boise Hollow to expand the easement area to such dimensions as are
necessary to comply with the requirements of the Ada County Highway District (ACHD) and
then dedicate the easement road to ACHD as a public road.
The City contends that the Permanent Easement Agreement does not call for the
expansion of the easement area.

Accordingly, Boise Hollow sought a declaration from the

District Court that, under the Permanent Easement Agreement, the easement road may be
expanded in order to meet ACHD's requirements.
Both parties filed motions for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the IDAHO RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE (I.R.C.P.). District Judge Jonathan Medema determined that the Permanent
Easement Agreement did not successfully convey a permanent easement to Boise Hollow's

1

Lot I, Block 2, Nibler Subdivision, Boise, Ada County, Idaho.

2

Lot 4, Block 2, Nibler Subdivision, Boise, Ada County, Idaho.
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now appeals
B.

Medema's decision.

Relevant Procedural History
The following District Court proceedings are pertinent to his appeal:

1.

Pleadings and Parties

Plaintiff Bedard and Musser filed its COMPLAINT FOR QUIET TITLE (R. 000007-000051) 3
on June 17, 2015. The City filed its ANSWER TO COMPLAINT (R. 000052-000057) on July 8,
2015.
Subsequently, Bedard and Musser assigned its interest in the 63-acre parcel and the
Permanent Easement Agreement to Boise Hollow. See R. 000105-000107. On December 2,
2016, it was ordered that Boise Hollow be joined as an additional party plaintiff to this matter.

See R. 000058-000059. The parties stipulated to the filing by Plaintiffs of the FIRST AMENDED
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL, which recites and incorporates Boise Hollow's
interest into the factual allegations and prayer for relief.
The FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT (R. 000060-000107) was filed on December 2, 2015.
The City's ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT (R. 000223-000228) was filed on December
14, 2015.

The Clerk's Record on Appeal is cited herein as "R." The Reporter's Transcript on Appeal is cited as "Tr." The
exhibits admitted at the trial are cited as "Ex."
3
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Boise Hollow's Motion
Opposition
Boise

Summary
000108-000109) on

filed its MOTION FOR

2015.

Concurrently,

IN SUPPORT OF

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (R. 000198-000222); [2] AFFIDAVIT OF REBECCA

w. ARNOLD ("Arnold Aff," R. 000134-000171);

[3] AFFIDAVIT OF KEVIN McCARTHY, P.E. (R.

000109-133); and [4] AFFIDAVIT OF DEAN w. BRIGGS, P.E. ("Briggs Aff.," R. 000172-000197).
On January 15, 2016, the City filed the following in direct opposition to Boise Hollow's
Motion:

[l]

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (R. 000375-000397); and [2] SECOND DECLARATION OF COUNSEL ABIGAIL R.
GERMAINE

(R. 000398-000404).

On February

2016, Boise Hollow filed its

IN SUPPORT OF

MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (R. 000405-000420).
The Court heard oral argument on this motion on February 16, 2016.

ii. The City's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, and Boise Hollow's
Opposition
The City filed DEFENDANT'S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (R.000229-

000230) on December 31, 2015. Concurrently, the City filed: [I] MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(R. 000231-000251); [2]

DECLARATION

OF TOMMY T. SANDERSON (R. 000352-000369).; and [3] DECLARATION OF COUNSEL ABIGAIL R.
GERMAINE (R. 000252-00035 l ).

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

OF
and

OF TOMMY

("Second Sanderson

R. 000430-000431).
On February 9, 2016,

City filed the following

further support of DEFENDANT'S

CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT: [l] REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S CROSSMOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (R 000523-000536); and [2] THIRD DECLARATION OF
COUNSEL ABIGAIL R GERMAINE (R 000537-000643).
The Court heard oral argument on this motion on February 16, 2016.

iii. City's Motions to Strike Affidavits of Arnold and Connell
On January 1

2016, in conjunction with its opposition to Boise Hollow's MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT, the City filed
ARNOLD (R. 000370-000374).
STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF REBECCA

MOTION TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT OF REBECCA W.

Boise Hollow filed PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO

w. ARNOLD (R 000421-000429) on February 2.

The City filed

its REPLY BRIEF REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT OF REBECCA W
ARNOLD (R. 000655-000658) on February 17.
On February 9, 2016, the City filed its MOTION TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT OF COLIN
CONNELL (R. 000644-000648).

Boise Hollow filed PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO

STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF COLIN CONNELL (R 000649-000654) on February 15.

APPELLANT'S

Judgment, and

Oral Argument on Cross-Motions
related Motions to Strike
on the cross-motions

summary

motions to strike, on February 16,201

3.

Judge Medema's MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: CROSS MOTIONS
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The Trial Court issued its MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: CROSS MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ("Memorandum Decision Re: MSJ," R. 000680-000697) on April 1, 2016.
Boise Hollow summarizes the essential findings of fact and conclusions of law which form the
basis of Judge Medema' s judgment in favor of the City as follows:

4.

•

The Permanent Easement Agreement did not successfully convey a permanent
easement across Lot 1, Block 2 of the Nibler Subdivision in favor of Lot 4, Block
2. As a matter of law, the Permanent Easement Agreement could not convey an
held only a
easement permanently burdening the title of Lot 1 because
leasehold interest. See R. 000688-000690.

•

The interest conveyed by the grantor under the Permanent Easement Agreement
was extinguished when the grantor transferred its interest in the leasehold to
another tenant in 1993, or upon termination of the lease in 2007. See R. 000694.
Jedge

Medema's

MEMORANDUM

DECISION

AND

ORDER

RE:

PARTIES'

VARIOUS MOTIONS TO STRIKE

Concurrent to Memorandum Decision Re: MSJ, THE TRIAL COURT also entered its
MEMORANDUM

DECISION AND

ORDER RE:

PARTIES'

VARIOUS

MOTIONS TO

STRIKE

(Memorandum Decision Re: Motions to Strike, R. 000674-000679). Thereby, Judge Medema
excluded all or some of the Arnold Aff, Connell Aff, and Second Sanderson Deel. as follows:

APPELLANT'S BR1EF

all

not
Arnold

as

"The Court admits the assertions contained in the last full paragraph on page 2 of
the affidavit of Rebecca Arnold, wherein Ms. Arnold asserts that, as Vancroft's
attorney, she personally drafted the Permanent Easement Agreement and that a
true and accurate copy of the Agreement is attached to her affidavit. The Court
admits the copy of the Agreement attached to her affidavit. The Court excludes
the remainder of the affidavit as irrelevant."
R. 000675-000676.

ii. Connell Aff. and Second Sanderson Deel.
On the basis that the Permanent Easement Agreement is unambiguous and testimony
pertaining to the parties' intent is not relevant, the District Court excluded all portions of the
Connell Aff. and Second Sanderson Deel.

5.

R. 000675.

Entry of Final Judgment and Amended Judgment

Final judgment in compliance with IRCP 54(a) was entered on June 7, 2016, when the
Trial Court entered its AMENDED JUDGMENT (R. 000714). Boise Hollow appeals therefrom.
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Summary History of the Land

Boise

the

the

set

Memorandum Decision Re: MSJ at R. 000682-000684:
In 1943 Victor Nibler purchased land in what is now northwest Boise, Idaho. 4 See R.
000543-000544. This land includes both parcels at issue in this case: "Lot 1"
by the City, and "Lot 4"

the parcel owned

the parcel owned by Boise Hollow. 5

In the 1970s Victor and Ruth Nibler (the "Niblers") constructed a golf course on portions
of their land. Lot I is located within the golf course. In 1980, the Niblers leased the golf course,
including Lot 1 to a group of individuals for a period of 99 years. See R. 000546-0005 550.
In 1986, the leasehold was assigned to Tee, Ltd. ("Tee"), whose principals included
Tommy and Roxanne Sanderson (the "Sandersons"). See R. 000566-000574.
In 1990, the Niblers sold much of their land, including Lot 1 and Lot 4, to Vancroft
Corporation ("V ancroft"). See R. 000576-000584. The Niblers also assigned their interest as
landlords of the golf course, including Lot 1, leasehold to V ancroft. See R. 000586-000591.
On September 14, 1991 Vancroft, Tee, and the Sandersons executed the Permanent

Nibler purchased (1) the Northeast of the Northeast
the West of the Northeast
the Southwest
and the
West 1/i of the Southeast 1/i of Section 21, Township 4 North, Range 2 East, Boise Meridia.11; and (2) the Northwest
Y4 and the Northwest Y4 of the Northeast Y4 of Section 28 in Township 4 North, Range 2 East from the Boise
Meridian.
4

"Lot 4" was commonly described by the parties in their briefing to the Trial Court as the "Development Parcel."
For the sake of uniformity, Boise Hollow herein adopts the term "Lot 4" which was employed by Judge Medema in
his Memorandum Decision Re: MSJ.

5
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In 1
County

,vith the

a

Office (R. 000182-000184). On the plat, the golf course was designated

as being Lots 2 and 6 in Block 1 and Lot l in Block 2 (a.k.a. "Lot 1

Nibler subdivision.

See id The portion of Vancroft's land that was not subject to the leasehold held by Tee was
designated as Lot 4 of Block 2 of the Nibler subdivision (a.k.a. "Lot 4"). See id.
The crux of the parties' dispute in this matter is [l] whether the Permanent Easement
Agreement created an easement over Lot 1 for the benefit of Lot 4, and [2] if that easement can
be expanded to meet the requirements of ACHD for the purpose of dedication and use as a public
street. The terms of the Permanent Easement Agreement are discussed in depth later below.
In 1993,

Ltd. assigned its interest in the leasehold

the golf course, including Lot 1,

to a Mr. David Hendrickson. See R. 000593-000594.
In October of 1993, Vancroft transferred title in Lot 4 to Bedard & Musser. See R.
000598-000599. Vancroft likewise assigned its interest in the Permanent Easement Agreement
to Bedard & Musser. See R. 000625-000643.
In 1999, Vancroft sold the golf course, including Lot 1, to BlueGrass, LLC. See R.
000601.
In 2007, Bluegrass, LLC and David Hendrickson terminated the lease. See R. 0006030005605. Bluegrass then conveyed the golf course, including Lot 1, to Quail Hollow, LLC, the

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

course,

R 000613-000620.
In 201
000623.

Bedard & Musser conveyed Lot 4 to Boise Hollow,

See R.

Concurrently, Bedard & Musser assigned its interest in the Permanent Easement

Agreement to Boise Hollow. See R 000105-000107.

2.

Current Status of Lot 1 and Lot 4

Boise Hollow holds title in fee simple to Lot 4 pursuant to that Quitclaim Deed dated
June 26, 2015, and recorded with the Ada County Recorder on July 13, 2015, as Instrument No.
2016-062695. See R. 000622-000623.
The City holds a conditional possessory interest in Lot 1 pursuant to that certain Deed of
Gift dated November 1, 201

and recorded with the Ada County Recorder on December 4,

2014, as Instrument No. 113130306. See R. 000613-000620.

3.

Platting the Nibler Subdivision

When the Niblers deeded a portion of the golf course property to Vancroft in 1990, they
inadvertently violated the City's then-existing subdivision ordinances by illegally dividing the
land. This prompted the Niblers, Sandersons, and Vancroft (collectively, the "Developers") to
begin the process of preparing and filing a subdivision plat designated as the Nibler Subdivision
parcels in order to properly subdivide the several segregations of land, comply with the City's
subdivision ordinances, and legally prepare the land adjacent to the golf course for future
development.

This process, of course, necessarily involved a lengthy series of preliminary

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

platting
the Nibler Subdivision.

0001

BEI drafted the preliminary and final

Subdivision

plats and worked closely with the City of Boise and ACHD during the plat review, revision, and
approval process. Id 6
During the plat review and approval process, the City required that BEI and the
Developers make certain revisions to the preliminary plat before the City would approve it to
become the final plat. R. 000173. The City was aware that the Nibler Subdivision, and its
parcels, might one day be developed into multi-residential subdivision(s) which would require
vehicular access to the adjacent public roadways. Id Accordingly, the City specifically required
that the Developers include a notation on the plat to clarify that ACHD has jurisdiction and
authority over any roads or applications to construct roads which would give the Nibler
Subdivision direct vehicular access to North 36th Street, which is the main public road adjacent
to the Nibler Subdivision and the Quail Hollow Golf Course. Id
The City's requirement that access to 36th Street be subject to ACHD's jurisdiction and
approval was communicated to the Developers by way of a letter from the City dated June 22,
1990. See Briggs Aff., EXHIBIT "A" (R. 000177-000180). At Paragraph 15 (the final paragraph

6

The testimony set forth in the Briggs Aff. is wholly uncontradicted. Moreover, the City has not challenged the
admissibility of any portion of the Briggs Aff., nor did the District Court strike any portion thereof.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

- 10.

access shall be allowed to
approved by Ada County Highway District.

unless otherwise

R. 000179 (emphasis added).
Per the City's instructions, BEI and the Developers revised the preliminary plat so that
the final plat does reflect the City's requirement that access to 36th Street be subject to ACHD's
jurisdiction, control, and approval. The final Nibler Subdivision plat was executed and recorded
on January 29, 1991 as Instrument No. 9205592. See Briggs Aff., EXHIBIT "B''

(R. 000181-

000184).
Note

of the final plat contains the City's required notation:

5.
Restricted Access: Except for Lots 3 and 4, Block 1, and Lots 2 and 3,
Block no lots in this subdivision shall be provided with a primary access to N.
36th Way, unless said primary access is specifically approved by the Ada
County Highway District.
R. 000182 (emphasis added). This required note on the final plat confirms not only that the City
was aware that the easement road might be expanded to meet ACHD's specifications, but that
the City expressly required that the authority to approve or deny the landowner's application to
do so be vested in ACHD.

4.

The Permanent Easement Agreement

After finalizing the Nibler Subdivision plat, Vancroft and Tee/the Sandersons
(collectively, Tee) negotiated the Permanent Easement Agreement to secure for Vancroft a
vehicular access easement across the Golf Course to North 36th Street for the benefit of Lot 4. In

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

l -

0001

Specifically, the parties requested that BEI

road width requirements for both private and public roads.
the parties intended that the easement road would initially be

the then-existing

It was communicated to BEI that

a limited width sufficient to

satisfy the then-existing requirements of a private road, and that the road would be expanded to
meet ACHD's requirements if it was later converted to public road and dedicated to ACHD. Id.
Accordingly, BEI advised Vancroft and the Tee that an easement width of 40' would satisfy the
then-existing requirements for a private road. R. 000175. BEI further advised that ACHD would
require a width in excess of that amount when the road was converted to a public road. Id.
Accordingly, the Permanent Easement Agreement describes the initial width of the
easement as being 40 feet wide.

See Permanent Easement Agreement at 1 (R. 000160),

numbered-paragraph "l ". However, the Permanent Easement Agreement, being in harmony
with City's requirements for the Nibler Subdivision plat, later provides that the size of the
easement road may be expanded to meet ACHD requirements for a public road:
6.
Upon the completion of the construction of the roadway, Grantee shall
have the right to dedicate said road to the Ada County Highway District or such
other governmental agency then having jurisdiction and control over public roads
and highways in Boise, Ada County, Idaho. Such road shall meet all then
existing ordinances and requirements, including the construction of roads,
curbs, sidewalks, bonding, etc. Upon such dedication, Grantee shall have no
further obligations hereunder, except for the obligation of this Agreement not
assumed by governmental agency.
Permanent Easement Agreement at 3 (R. 000162), numbered-paragraph "6" (emphasis added).
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terms

facts:
•

The primary purpose of the Permanent

Agreement was to secure for

Vancroft a perpetual access easement across Lot 1 for the benefit of Lot 4. R. 000136.
•

At the time that the Permanent Easement Agreement was drafted, it was agreed

that the easement road would be 40 feet in width, which would be temporarily sufficient
as a private road until Vancroft (or its successor-in-interest) was ready to develop the Lot
4 into a multi-lot residential subdivision. Id.
•

When the parties executed the Permanent Easement Agreement, Tee understood

that Vancroft intended to develop the Development Parcel into a multi-lot residential
subdivision. Therefore it was contemplated and agreed by Vancroft and Tee that the
easement road would eventually be dedicated to ACHD as a public road, and the
easement area would be expanded to comply with whatever ACHD's requirements for a
public road would be at the time of the dedication. The purpose of numbered-paragraph
"6" of the Permanent Easement Agreement was to ensure that the owner of the
Development Parcel would have the right to expand the easement road accordingly. R.
000136-0001
•

The anticipated dedication is expressly acknowledged in numbered-paragraph "2"

of the Permanent Easement Agreement:

BRIEF

or
the easement area, including, but not limited
engineering, surveying, construction, and dedication, it being
understood that the easement area is
the benefit of the Grantee and the
owners, occupants and users of Lot 4, Block 2, Nibler Subdivision. All
utilities shall be located in the easement area.
R. 000136.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

The primary issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in determining that the
Permanent Easement Agreement did not convey a permanent easement across Lot 1 in favor of
Lot 4, which Boise Hollow may now expand to meet ACHD's requirements. The following
issues are necessarily incidental to the primary question:
(1) Could
as leasehold tenants of Lot 1, convey a permanent easement to
Vancroft, fee simple owner of Lot 1?
(2) Was the interest conveyed by Tee under the Permanent Easement Agreement
extinguished when the grantor transferred its interest in the leasehold to another
tenant in 1993, or upon termination of the lease in 2007?
(3) Does Boise Hollow have the right under the plain language of the Permanent
Easement Agreement to expand the road to meet ACHD's specifications and
requirements, and then dedicate the road to ACHD?
(4) Was the language of the Permanent Easement Agreement ambiguous?
(5) If the language of the Permanent Easement Agreement is ambiguous, did the
District Court err in striking or partially striking and excluding from its
consideration the Arnold Aff, the Connell Aff., and the Second Sanderson Deel.?
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and
Daker, 154 Idaho 975, 303 P.3d l

V.

1, 1233 (2013). This Court applies a de novo standard to

legal questions and a clear error standard to findings of fact Herrera v. Estay, 146 Idaho 674,
679, 201 P.3d 647, 652 (2009). When reviewing a trial court's conclusions oflaw, "this Court is
not bound by the legal conclusions of the trial court, but may draw its own conclusions from the
facts presented." Steuerer v. Richards, 155 Idaho 280, 311 PJd 292, 294 (2013). This Court
may set aside a trial court's findings of fact if they found to be clearly erroneous. I.R.C.P. 52(a);
Kennedy v. Schneider, 151 Idaho 440,442,259 P.3d 586,588 (2011).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

A Tee effectively conveyed a permanent easement to Vancroft because [l] Vancroft, as fee
title owner Lot 1, consented to its being subject to a permanent easement, and [2]
Vancroft never held concurrent unity of possession and title with respect to Lot 1 and Lot
4. The permanent easement was not subsequently extinguished by the termination of the
lease because at no point has there been concurrence of the common law unities.
B. The City should be estopped from denying the existence of the easement because when it

accepted the Deed of Gift it assumed and became bound to the known obligations and
duties appurtenant to Lot I, including the easement and the Permanent Easement
Agreement
C. The plain language of the Permanent Easement Agreement provides Boise Hollow the
right to expand the road to meet ACHD's specifications and requirements.
D. If the Court finds that the language of the Permanent Easement Agreement was
ambiguous, [1] the parol evidence establishes that the parties intended for the grantee and
its successors to have the right to expand the road to meet ACHD's specifications and
requirements, and [2] the District Court erred by striking the Arnold Aff., Connell Aff.,
and Second Sanderson Deel.
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"'""'""'"''" .... a permanent easement to Vancroft because [1] Vancroft, as
fee title owner Lot 1, consented to its being subject to a permanent easement, and [2]
Vancroft never held concurrent unity of possession and title with respect to Lot 1
and Lot 4. The permanent easement was not subsequently extinguished by the
termination of the lease because at no point has there been concurrence of the
common law unities.
"'H'o .. ic 1 "'"'' 1"

The District Court based its holding primarily on two conclusions: first that Tee, being
merely a lessee, was unable to encumber Lot 1 with a permanent easement; and second, that
Vancroft, being the owner of Lot 1, could not have an easement over it Boise Hollow concedes
that typically, a lessee cannot burden its leasehold with an easement which outlasts the leasehold,
and, typically, an owner cannot grant an easement to itself. However, the circumstances at work
in this instance were not typical. Blind application of the foregoing rules under circumstances
such as these does disservice to the rationales underlying the rules.
Agreement

plainly states that

parties' intent was to

create a "permanent" and "perpetual" "easement" for the benefit of the dominant parcel. 7 The
following verbiage appears on page 1 of the Permanent Easement Agreement:
Vancroft has requested Tee, Ltd. to grant it an easement across the southwest
portion of Lot 1, Block 2, Nibler Subdivision, to provide access and utilities to
Lot 4, Block 2, of the subdivision, and Tee, Ltd. is willing to grant the easement
R. 000160 (emphasis added).

7

Based on the District Court's interpretation of Idaho law concerning the creation of easements, the District Court
concluded that the parties to the Easement Agreement intended not to create an easement, but rather to create a
license. See R. 000693. However, the plain language of the Easement Agreement very clearly and expressly states
the parties' intent to create a permanent and perpetual easement rather than a temporary license. See R. 000160000162.
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R 000160-000161 (emphasis added).

See

Paragraphs 2, 3,

Easement Agreement referencing the "easement area.

5

Permanent

Id. at 000161-000162. Surely the parties

would not have contemplated the building of a road and its dedication to ACHD if the right were
meant to be temporary. See Paragraph 6 of Permanent Easement Agreement (R 000162).
The intent of Tee and Vancroft is self-evident from the language of the Permanent
Easement Agreement The Court's primary objective when interpreting a contract is to discover
the mutual intent of the parties at the time the contract is made.

Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65,

69, 175 P.3d 754, 758 (2007). "Indeed, the cardinal principle of contract interpretation is that the
intention of the parties must prevail unless it is inconsistent with some established rule of law."

11 Williston on Contracts §

(4th ed.).

In light of the parties' clear intent, the question is whether they were legally capable of
accomplishing their mutual goal of burdening Lot l with a permanent access and utility easement
for the benefit of Lot 4. To answer this question, the Court should seek to reconcile the plainlystated intent of Tee and V ancroft with the applicable rules of law and the rationales underlying
those rules. In doing so, the Court should conclude that Tee effectively conveyed a permanent
easement to Vancroft because [ 1] V ancroft, as fee title owner Lot 1, consented to its being
subject to a permanent easement, and [2] Vancroft never held concurrent unity of possession and
title with respect to Lot 1 and Lot 4.
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Vancroft, as
permanent easement.
that
tenant, the District Court relied upon

1 because it was merely a
Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses § 12 which states

that "[a]n easement can be created only by a person who has title to or an estate in the servient
tenement, and an easement may not create a right that the grantor did not possess." 8 However,
while a lessee cannot grant a right in the servient parcel that it does not possess, the inverse is
certainly also be true: a lessee can grant a right in the servient parcel which it does possess.
Boise Hollow's position is equally simple: Tee had the right and authority to create the intended
permanent easement across Lot 1 because Vancroft granted Tee the right to do so.

"[A] leasehold is an estate in real property." Coppedge v.
P.2d 977, 979

95

71 Idaho 248,

I, 229

years," as opposed to a

"freehold estate." See Tobias v. State Tax Comm 'n, 85 Idaho 250, 256, 378 P.2d 628, 631
(1963). The holder of such estate has a possessory right

the land. A lessee has a possessory

interest in the land, while the lessor retains a reversionary interest. Wing v. Martin, I 07 Idaho
267, 272, 688 P.2d 1172, 1177 (1984).
"Any person with a possessory interest in land may create an easement burdening that
person's interest."

The Law of Easements & Licenses in Land, Persons who may create

Boise Hollow is unaware of any Idaho authority bearing upon the right of a tenant to encumber the leasehold
property with an easement. Neither the City nor the District Court cited any during the proceedings below.
Accordingly, this may be an issue of first impression in Idaho.
8
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Bingham

630 (1970) ("It is

, 93

recognized that in the instant case the appellant under the terms of the lease has practically all of
the rights in and to the warehouse normally considered as incident to ownership of the propertyuse of the property, right to encumber it, the right to transfer it (subject to approval), the right to
improve, alter and change it; ... "); see also Restatement of Property§ 124 (1942); see also e.g.,
Isely v. City of Wichita, 38 Kan. App. 2d 1022, 1024, 174 P.3d 919,921 (2008); Martin v. Sun
Pipe Line Co., 542 Pa. 281, 285-287, 666 A.2d 637, 639-640 (1995).
Generally, a leaseholder generally has no power to permanently burden the reversion.
The Law of Easements & Licenses in Land § 3

Therefore an easement granted by a tenant

does not last beyond the interest that the grantor held in the servient tenement Id In other
words, a tenant-granted easement terminates with the tenancy. The policy underlying this rule
of course, to protect the owner of the servient estate from being bound by an encumbrance
granted unilaterally by his tenant without the owner's approval. See Leichtfuss v. Dabney, 329
Mont 129, 122 P.3d 1220 (Montana 2005) (citing Rest3d § 4.3 cmt. e, at 526).
The policy discouraging a tenant from permanently burdening the fee is not implicated
where the party

by the

indeed who

the

is also the owner

of the servient parcel. In such case, the holder of the reversion has granted the leaseholder the
power to burden the freehold estate. Therefore, it follows that where, as here, the easement is
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rigid

a

that

an easement from running to a remainderman or reversioner is unsound" where the easement
benefited reversion, consistent with parties' expectations. Id at 141-45, 122 P.3d at 1229-1
In Leichtfuss, the question was whether an easement could persist where it was the
dominant estate, rather than the servient, which was held in less than fee simple at the time of the
encumbrance. The Leichtfuss court's discussion of the issues is particularly instructive, as it
discusses how the policies underlying the rule come into play where the owner of the fee is
actually benefited rather than prejudiced by the encumbrance Gust as Vancroft was benefited
rather than prejudiced by the easement in this case):
. . . a number of courts have held that an easement burdening or benefitting an
estate less than a fee simple ends when that estate expires. See Jon W. Bruce &
James W. Ely, Jr., The Law of Easements and Licenses in Land,§ 10:15, at 10-28
(2001 ), and cases cited therein. As such, it may be more precise to say that an
easement runs with the estate in land to which it is appurtenant, or that it follows
ownership of the estate for as long as that estate exists.
The foundation for this principle is easily understood where the servient tenement
is held in less than fee simple: a person can convey no more or greater title than
he holds. See Rest.3d § 4.3 cmt. e, at 526 ("The duration of a servitude is
normally limited to the duration of the estate of the creator of the servitude
because the creator cannot burden a greater estate than he or she has.") (emphasis
added). In other words, a life tenant or a lessee generally cannot impose upon his
land a burden that passes to the remainderman or the reversioner.
Where the dominant tenement is held in less than fee simple, however, the basis
for the foregoing rule-which prevents the benefit of an easement from running to
the remainderman or reversioner is less obvious. A number of courts have ruled
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0, the owner of a fee simple in Blackacre, granted an easement to
A, the ovvner of a 10-year lease term in Whiteacre, to use the
driveway across Blackacre for access to Whiteacre. The deed
states that the easement is intended to benefit the term and the
reversion in Whiteacre. The servitude burdens the fee-simple
estate in Blackacre and benefits both the leasehold estate and the
reversion in Whiteacre.

Rest.3d § 2.5 illus. 3, at 100 (emphasis added). As this illustration demonstrates,
the termination of a dominant estate held in less than fee simple does not
automatically extinguish an easement appurtenant thereto. Rather, it is the intent
or expectations of the parties to the servitude which determine the duration
thereof.
Indeed, a careful reading of the opinions of each of the aforementioned courts
which held that an easement granted to a life tenant or a lessee terminates with the
life estate or lease reveals that the results in those cases were grounded, to some
extent, on a presumption that the grantor of the easement was aware of the
terminable nature of the grantee's estate and intended the easement to exist only
for that limited duration, or that the life tenant or lessee did not intend to
permanently burden the servient estate. The Third Restatement has succinctly
described this approach in the following terms: "A servitude should be
interpreted to give effect to the intention of the parties ascertained from the
language used in the instrument, or the circumstances surrounding creation of
the servitude, and to carry out the purpose for which it was created." Rest.3d
§ 4.1(1), at 496-97 (emphasis added).
Having considered the foregoing authorities in the context of the facts of the case
at hand, we conclude that rigid application a rule that
the
an
easement from running to a remainderman or reversioner is unsound.

Id at 142-44, 122 P.3d at 1229-31 (bold emphasis added, italic emphasis in original).
The same concerns are at stake in the instant case as were considered by the Leichtfuss

BR1EF

to
language used in the
or
the servitude, and to carry out the
111oi"rY11CPol'•rl

Id at 144, 122 P.3d at 1

l (quoting Restatement (Third) of Property, Servitudes§ 4.1(1)).

The foregoing discussion is particularly applicable in this case.

Montana Supreme

Court essentially asked one question: Could the parties manifest intent be given effect without

running afoul of the applicable rules of law? To answer that question, the Court analyzed the
policy underlying the rule generally prohibiting the permanence of the easement to determine if
its application in this instance was well-served.

Recognizing that the policy was for the

protection of the fee simple owner, the Court determined that it did not make sense to prohibit
the creation of a permanent easement where the fee simple owner would be hindered rather than
protected.
The Montana Supreme Court's holding in Leichtfuss likewise comports with the rule that
an easement appurtenant becomes "fixed as an appurtenance to the real property" and "[serve]
the owner of the dominant estate in a way that cannot be separated from his rights in the land."

Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 230, 76 P.3d 969, 974 (2003). As an easement appurtenant
follows the land which it benefits, it cannot be unilaterally terminated by an act of the owner of
the servient estate. See 80 AL.R.2d 743; Restatement (Third) of Property, Servitudes § 4.8
(2000); Beckstead v. Price, 146 Idaho 57, 190 P.3d 876 (2008); Slauson v. Marozzo Plumbing &

Heating, LLC,
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Mont 75, 82, 219 P.3d 509, 515 (Montana 2009) (termination of lease did

15,

this case,

as in Leichtfuss, this Court must

both at the manifest intent of the

contracting parties and determine whether any rationale or policy is actually served by
prohibiting the imposition of a permanent easement under these particular circumstances. As in
Leichtfuss, doing so would hinder rather than protect the

successors-in-interest.

simple owner (Vancroft) and its

Accordingly, prohibiting the permanent easement would disserve the

underlying policy that the fee simple owner should not be harmed by an easement To the
contrary, in this case it is the prohibition of the easement that would harm the owner.
2. There are no grounds to prohibit a landowner from consenting to the
creation of an easement across land owned but never possessed. In this case,
Vancroft never held concurrent unity of possession and title with respect to
Lot 1 and Lot 4 because Lot 1 was subject to a 99-year lease when Vancroft
took ownership.
Superficially, Boise Hollow's position would seem to run counter to the rule that a
landowner cannot create an easement in his own land. See Capstar Radio Operating Co. v.
Lawrence, 153 Idaho 411,420,283 P.3d 728, 737 (2012). However, it would not be appropriate

to apply that rule under these circumstances because at the time of the agreement V ancroft did
not have possession of Lot 1 and was very unlikely to obtain possession of Lot 1 prior to
divesting itself of both Lot I and Lot 4. Neither Vancroft, nor any of its successors-in-interest,
ever had concurrent title and possession of Lot 1 and Lot
The rule that "one cannot have an easement in his own lands" was first set forth in Idaho
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necessary for the reasonable use and enjoyment

either parcel:

True, an easement is defined as a right in the lands of another, and therefore one
cannot have an easement in his own lands (19 C. J: p. 863), but, where the owner
of an entire tract employs a part thereof so that he "derives from the other a
benefit or advantage of a continuous and apparent nature, and sells the one in
favor of which such continuous and apparent quasi easement exists, such
easement being necessary to the reasonable enjoyment of the property granted,
will pass to the grantee by implication." 19 C. J. p. 914. See, also, 1 Thompson on
Real Property, § 352; 9 R. C. L. p. 755, § 22; German Savings & Loan Society v.
Gordon, 54 Or. 147, 102 P. 736, 26 L. RA. (N. S.) 33 L

Id. at 376, 288 P. at 429.
Moreover, the rule preventing a landowner from having an easement in his own land is
ostensibly based in the doctrine of merger. The doctrine of merger operates to extinguish an
easement when the dominant and servient parcels come under common ownership and
possession. See, e.g., Davis v. Gowen, 83 Idaho 204, 210, 360 P.2d 403, 406 (1961). However,
operation of the doctrine of merger requires unity of both ownership and possession. Since
Vancroft never had possession of the servient parcel, the doctrine of merger does not apply.
"For an easement to be extinguished under the doctrine of merger, there must
be unity of title, and, according to some authorities, of possession and enjoyment of the dominant
and servient estates." 28A Corpus Juris Secundum, Easements § 143, Unity of title (2016)
(emphasis added). "The ownership of the two estates must be coextensive and equal in validity,
quality, and all other circumstances ofright. Accordingly, an easement is not extinguished under

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Idaho,
possession.

title,

law

Ogilvie v. Idaho Bank &

, 99 Idaho 361, 366, 582

(emphasis added); see also Afatter of Estate of Ashe, 114 Idaho 70, 75,
App. 1988) aff'd, 117 Idaho 266, 787 P .2d 252 (1990) (reciting common

215, 220 (1978)
P.2d 281, 286 (Ct.
unities, including

title and possession); see also Guy v. State, 438 A2d 1250, 1253 (DeL Super. Ct. 1981) ("The
doctrine of merger does not operate where the fee in the servient estate is subject to an
outstanding estate in possession."). Of course, unity of possession would destroy an easement.
See Wilton v. Smith, 40 Idaho 81,

1 P. 704, 705 (1924) (quoting Quinlan v. Noble, 75 Cal. 250,

17 P. 69 (1888) ("No easement exists so long as the unity of possession remains ... ")).
The binding authority discussing the doctrine of merger pertains to the scenario where an
existing easement is extinguished because the dominant and servient parcels become united in
interest, title, time, and possession. However, the rationale underlying the doctrine of merger
functions both forwards and backwards. In other words: just as the concurrence of the unities is
required to extinguish an easement, the absence of such concurrence functions to preserve an
easement. Accordingly, an easement may be created over one parcel for the benefit of another,
despite common ownership of both parcels, where unity is broken as regards interest, time, and,
most significantly, possession. Such was the case at the time that Vancroft and Tee entered into
the Permanent Easement Agreement.
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1
Throughout

the foregoing transfers, the dominant and servient

owned and possessed by the same party at the same time. Accordingly,

never
creation of the

easement was not prevented by concurrence in the common law unities.

3. The permanent easement was not subsequently extinguished by the
termination of the lease because of the doctrine of merger. At no point has
there been concurrence of the common law unities.
For the same reason that the easement was not prevented, nor has it been extinguished.
The District Court concluded that the interest taken by Vancroft under the Permanent Easement
Agreement would have been extinguished when Tee transferred its interest in the leasehold to
another tenant in 1993, or upon termination of the lease in 2007. See R. 000694. However, this

In fact, at no time during its ownership was Van croft ever entitled to have possession of Lot I due to the 99-year
leasehold. As of the date of the Permanent Easement Agreement, Vancroft owned both Lot I and Lot 4, but Tee
held possession of Lot I. Vancroft assigned Lot 4 to Plaintiff Bedard & Musser in 1993 pursuant to that certain
CORPORATE WARRANTY DEED dated October 19, 1993, executed by Van croft Corporation, and recorded on
November 3, 1993, as Ada County Instrument No. 9392443. See R. 000598-000599. Tee maintained possession of
Lot 1. Tee assigned its leasehold interest in Lot I to David Hendrickson in 1993 pursuant to that certain
ASSIGNMENT AND ASSUMPTION OF GOLF COURSE LEASE dated June 30, 1993, executed by Tee, Ltd., and recorded
on June 30, 1993, as Ada County Instrument No. 9351843. See R 000593-000594. Vancroft assigned its
ownership of Lot l to Bluegrass, LLC in 1999 pursuant to that certain CORPORATE WARRANTY DEED dated March
29, 1999, executed by Vancroft Corporation, and recorded on March 30, 1999, as Ada County Instrument No.
99030645. See R. 000601. Bluegrass, LLC and Hendrickson agreed to the termination of the leasehold interest in
2007 pursuant to that certain TERMINATION OF LEASE dated October 4, 2007, executed by Bluegrass, LLC, and
David Hendrickson, and recorded on October 4, 2007, as Ada County Instrument No. 107138040. See R. 0006030005605. Lot I was conveyed to Quail Hollow, LLC, in 2007 pursuant to that certain WARRANTY DEED dated
October 4, 2007, executed by Bluegrass, LLC in favor of Quail Hollow, LLC, and recorded on October 4, 2007, as
Ada County Instrument No. 107138039. See R. 000607-00061 L Plaintiff Bedard & Musser maintained ownership
of Lot 4 until assigning it to Plaintiff Boise Hollow Land Holdings, RLLP in 2015 pursuant to that certain
QUITCLAIM DEED dated June 26, 2015, executed by Bedard & Musser in favor of Boise Hollow Land Holdings,
RLLP, and recorded on July 13, 2015, as Ada County Instrument No. 2015-062695. See R. 000105-000107.
9
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set
create a permanent access
1 for the benefit

easement across

4.

Just as the mechanics of the doctrine of merger permitted the creation
too did those mechanics prevent extinguishment of the easement when

the easement, so

assigned the lease in

1993, or when the lease ended in 2007. Neither of those events resulted in concurrence in the
common law unities. Moreover, upon creation the easement became "fixed as an appurtenance
to the [servient estate]" and "serves the owner of the dominant estate in a way that cannot be
separated from his rights in the land." Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho

230, 76 P.3d 969, 974

(2003). As an easement appurtenant follows the land which it benefits, it cannot be unilaterally
terminated by an act of the owner of the servient estate. See 80 A.L.R2d 743· Restatement
(Third) of Property, Servitudes § 4.8 (2000). Thus, neither Tee nor any of its successors had the
right to terminate the easement by any unilaterally action such as terminating the lease.
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should be
easement
it accepted the Deed
it assumed
to the known
obligations and duties appurtenant to Lot 1, including the easement and the
Permanent Easement Agreement.
When the City acquired Lot 1, it did so with full knowledge of the encumbrance placed
upon the land by the Permanent Easement Agreement and the specific terms of the thereof. See
R 000618. The City is bound by those terms not only because they run with the land as
described hereinabove, but also because the City contractuaUy subscribed to them.
Where one accepts a deed of real property, one assumes and becomes bound to the
kno\vn obligations and duties appurtenant thereto. See Lane v. Pac. & IN Ry. Co., 8 Idaho 230,
67 P. 656, 658 (1902). Covenants, agreements and restrictions relating to the real property are
valid and enforceable. See Jacklin Land Co. v. Blue Dog RV, Inc., 151 Idaho 242,246,254 P.3d
1238, 1242 (2011). Those Courts that have specifically considered the issue of the contractual
nature of covenants have ruled that recorded covenants and declarations are contractual

nature

because the acceptance of the terms of the covenants and chain of title agreements results from
an O\vner voluntarily taking title to the property as part of a sale and thereby impliedly agrees
and consents to the obligations contained in those recorded covenants and conditions. See, e.g.,
Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Mkt Dev. (US), LLC, 55 Cal. 4th 223,237, 282 P.3d

121

1225 (2012). Thus, the recorded agreement and covenants therein become the rights and

responsibilities of contracting parties determined by the terms of their recorded contract.
Frances T v. Vill. Green Owners Assn., 42 CaL 3d 490,512, 723 P.2d 573 (1986).

Idaho law bearing on equitable servitudes is also instructive. An equitable servitude
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at
185 (2007)

Covenants,

§1

(an equitable servitude arises

"by implication from the language of the deeds or the conduct of the parties.

It concerns a

promise of the landowner to refrain from using his land in a certain way. See, e.g., Idaho Power

v. State, By & Through Dep't of Water Res., 104 Idaho 575,587,661 P.2d 741, 753 (1983)
("restrictive covenants and equitable servitudes" relate to "[a]greements not to assert ownership
rights"). An equitable servitude is therefore restrictive in character. St. Clair v. Krueger, 115
Idaho 702, 703 n.l, 769 P.2d 579, 580 n.1 (1989). This Court held in W Wood Investments,
supraruled as follows:
Whether a successor in interest takes the interest subject to the equitable servitude
is a question of notice. Streets, 898 P.2d at 379-81 (Wyo. 1995). Whether a party
has notice of an issue or event is a question of fact See, e.g, Taylor v. Soran
Restaurant, Inc. 131 Idaho 525, 960 P.2d 1254 (1998) (Whether notice of injury
subject to workers' compensation claim was given to employer was question of
fact)
141 Idaho at 85, 106 P.3d at 106.
A purchaser is charged with every fact shown by the records and is presumed to
know every other fact which an examination suggested by the records would have
disclosed. Kalange v. Rencher, 136 Idaho 192, 195-96, 30 P.3d 970, 973-74
(2001) (citing Cordova v. Hood, 84 U.S. (17 Wall) 1, 21 L.Ed. 587 (1872);
Northwestern Bank v. Freeman, 171 U.S. 620, 19 S.Ct 36, 43 L.Ed. 307 (1898)).
"This Court has stated: 'One who purchases or encumbrances with notice of
inconsistent claims does not take in good faith, and one who fails to investigate
the open and obvious inconsistent claim cannot take in good faith.' " Middlekauff
II, 110 Idaho at 916, 719 P.2d at 1176 (quoting Langroise v. Becker, 96 Idaho
218,220,526 P.2d 178, 180 (1974)).
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1S

an

of Lot 4 because the City had notice of the physical and legal existence to the easement
road prior to acquiring Lot 1. See 1U.iddlekaujf v. Lake Cascade, Inc., 103 Idaho 832, 654 P.2d
13 85 ( 1982) ("Middlekauff I"); ,'vfiddlekaujfv. Lake Cascade, Inc., 110 Idaho 909, 719 P .2d 1169
(1986) ("Middlekauff If'); W Wood Investments, supra; Ute Park Summer Home Association v.

Maxwell Land Grant Co., 77 N.M. 730, 427 P.2d 249 (Ct.App.1967), affd, 83 N.M. 558, 494
P.2d 971 (1972). In any event, so strong is the binding nature of the recorded instrument on
grantees in the chain of title that even if the instrument is misfiled by the county recorder, it is
still binding on the grantees. See lvfiller v. Simonson, 140 Idaho 287, 291, 92 P3d 537, 541
(2004).
In this case, the City took ownership of Lot 1 with knowledge of the existence of the
easement and with the understanding that the easement and the Permanent Easement Agreement
were both valid and enforceable. Further, the City contractually agreed to comply with the terms
of the Permanent Easement Agreement See R. 000460 (DONATION AGREEMENT between the
City and Quail Hollow, LLC, incorporating DEED OF GIFT as Exhibit "A" thereto); see also R.
000618, 113 (referencing Permanent Easement Agreement).
Accordingly, when the City took ownership of the Golf Course, it expressly accepted the
easement and assumed all rights and obligations under the Permanent Easement Agreement and
it should be estopped from denying the existence of the easement in this case.
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Easement
to meet ACHD's specifications and
the Permanent Easement Agreement is that
Vancroft: and Tee intended for Vancroft: to have a 40 foot-wide private road easement until such
time as Vancroft: or its successor chose to develop Lot 4, at which point the road would be
expanded to meet ACHD's requirements.
The dispute between Boise Hoilow and the City with regard to the meaning of the
Permanent Easement Agreement comes down to a difference in interpretation.
interpretation of a contract begins with the language of the contract itself."

"The

Cristo Viene

Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304, 308, 160 P.3d 743, 747 (2007) (quoting
Independence Lead Mines Co. v. Hecla Mining Co., 143 Idaho 22, 26, 137 P.3d 409, 413

(2006)). "If a contract's language is unambiguous, 'then its meaning and legal effect must be
determined from its words."' Boise Mode,

v. Donahoe Pace & Partners Ltd, 154 Idaho 99,

108, 294 P.3d 1111, 1120 (2013) (quoting Cristo Viene, 144 304 at 308, 160 P.3d at 747). "The
Court's 'primary objective when interpreting a contract is to discover the mutual intent of the
parties at the time the contract is made. If possible, the intent of the parties should be ascertained
from the language of the agreement as the best indication of their intent."' Guzman v. Piercy,
155 Idaho 928, 936, 318 P.3d 918, 926 (2014) (quoting Straub, supra).
Two clauses of a contract related to the same thing must be "read together and
harmonized" unless they are "so repugnant that they cannot stand together." See Morgan v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 68 Idaho 506, 518, 201 P.2d 976, 983 (1948). Furthermore, "an
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contract.

' 1

997). "Apparently conflicting provisions must be reconciled so as to
rather than nullifying any contractual provision,
reasonable interpretation of the entire instrument

meaning to both,

reconciliation can be effected by any
Madrid v. Roth, 134 Idaho 802, 806, 10 P.3d

751, 755 (Ct App. 2000) (quoting 17A Corpus Juris Secundum, Contracts§ 324 (1999)). In
other words, "[t]erms of a written instrument should be construed in pari materia and a
construction adopted that gives effect to all terms used. Inconsistent parts in a contract are to be
reconciled, if susceptible of reconciliation .... " Advance Tank & Const. Co. v. Gulf Coast Asphalt
Co., 968 So. 2d 520, 526 (Ala. 2006).

The dispute in this case is a result of Permanent Easement Agreement containing two
separate descriptions of the easement area: numbered-paragraph 1 of the Permanent Easement
Agreement states that the width of the easement road is 40 feet, while numbered-paragraph 6
explains that in the event the owner dedicates the road to ACHD, the width of the easement road
shall meet ACHD's requirements for a public road. As described above, these provisions can be
read together and a common-sense reading of these provisions does not reveal a conflict. Thus,
there are few similar controversies which have reached the appellate level in any jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, the case law that is reasonably on point confirms the judicial policy
harmonizing supposedly "conflicting" provisions wherever possible.
For example, in Thornton v. Hamilton, 32 Idaho 304, 181 P. 700 (1919), a contract for
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to

the

thereof as specified above.

A separate

required the lessee,

at the expiration or termination of the lease, to "restore the said personal property to the said
lessor in like good condition in which it now is, wear and diminution resulting from reasonable
use thereof excepted." Id. The lessor contended that these provisions were inconsistent, which
contention was rejected outright by the Idaho Supreme Court: "The provisions of the contract are
not inconsistent, and the intention of the parties that appellants should be insurers of the horses
while in their possession is entirely clear from the language employed." Id.
The 2002 Fifth Circuit case of Pers. Sec. & Safety Sys. Inc. v. Motorola Inc., 297 F.3d
388 (5th Cir. 2002) is perhaps more instructive. In that case, the court was called upon to
determine whether a forum-selection clause in a stock-purchase agreement conflicted with an
arbitration agreement contained in a licensing agreement that was executed alongside the stockpurchase agreement. The forum-selection clause stated: "Governing law. This agreement shall
be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Texas. Any suit or
proceeding brought hereunder shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts located
in Texas." 297 F.3d at 395 (some capitalization omitted). The plaintiff in that case, PSSI,
argued that Llie forum-selection clause required that any dispute arising out of the stock-purchase
agreement be litigated in Texas courts, thus expressly excluding arbitration. The court held:
We do not find PSSI's interpretation of the forum selection clause persuasive.
Standing alone, one could plausibly read the forum selection clause to mean that
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we must interpret
contractual arrangement and we must give effect to all
arrangement. Given our conclusion that the arbitration provision in the Product
Development Agreement applies to all claims related to the overall transaction,
we must therefore interpret the forum selection provision in the Stock Purchase
Agreement in a manner that is consistent with the arbitration provision.
Reading the two provisions together, it becomes clear that the forum selection
clause does not require the parties to litigate all claims in Texas courts, nor does it
expressly forbid arbitration of claims arising under the Stock Purchase
Agreement. Instead, we interpret the forum selection clause to mean that the
parties must litigate in Texas courts only those disputes that are not subject to
arbitration-for example, a suit to challenge the validity or application of the
arbitration clause or an action to enforce an arbitration award. Rather than
covering all "disputes" or all "claims" like the arbitration provision in the Product
Development Agreement, the forum selection clause confers "exclusive
jurisdiction" on Texas courts only with respect to "any suit or proceeding." This
limitation suggests that the parties intended the clause to apply only in the event
of a non-arbitrable dispute that must be litigated in court.

Personal Security, 297 F.3d at 395-96 (footnotes and internal citations and quotations omitted)
Turning to the clauses at issue in the Permanent Easement Agreement, numberedparagraphs "I" and "6" are certainly not patently inconsistent

Vancroft and Tee carefully

crafted an agreement whereby Vancroft took possession of an easement road which would be 40
feet wide until such time as Vancroft chose to dedicate it to ACHD, at which point it would be
expanded to meet ACHD's requirements at the time. In this way, the parties purposely drafted
flexible language that allowed their contract to fluidly incorporate ACHD's unknown future
specifications while also providing an ascertainable width (i.e., 40 feet) for use in the interim. In
short, these provisions worked together, as the parties intended, to provide the parties with an
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agreement and gives

to the parties'

The City argued below that because Paragraph 1 does not use the word "initial" and
because Paragraph 6 does not include a word such as "expand," they cannot be interpreted so as
to call for subsequent expansion of the easement area.

Therefore, the City contends that

Paragraph 6 "simply authorizes Boise Hollow to dedicate any potential future road ... if such
road meets ACHD's then-current construction specification." R. 000243.
However, the City's argument fails by its very own logic: Paragraph I does not contain
words which express any prohibition on future enlargement. More importantly, Paragraph 6
does not contain the word "if' or any other language suggesting a contingency which must be
met before the road can be constructed and dedicated to ACHD. Paragraph 6 simply states that
the "road" once constructed "shall meet all then-existing ordinances.

R. 000162 (emphasis

added). If the parties to the Permanent Easement Agreement had desired to restrict the size of
the roadway, regardless of ACHD requirements at the time of its construction and dedication, the
parties could easily have drafted a provision which stated that the roadway "shall not exceed 40'
regardless of ACHD requirements for a roadway." That is not what the parties did. The plain
language

Paragraphs 1

Paragraph 6

not employ any language

which would

render the Grantees' right to construct and dedicate the road contingent upon ACHD accepting
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denotes a mandate. See,
("This Court on several occasions
discretionary.

The structure

P.2d 1003, 1006
construed the word 'shall' as being mandatory and not
the sentence is such that the subject ("Such road") must

perform the verb ("shall meet") necessary to conform to the object ("all then existing ordinances
and requirements ... "). Therefore, the state (i.e., the size) of the subject ("Such road") must
necessarily be malleable in order to perform its directive.
The most reasonable, logical, and plain interpretation of Paragraphs 1 and 6 of the
Permanent Easement Agreement is Boise Hollow's: Vancroft and Tee intended for Vancroft to
own a 40 foot-wide private road easement (being large enough to encompass the dirt road then
existing) until such time as Vancroft chose to develop it, at which point it would be expanded to
meet ACHD's requirements.

10

A plain way to express such a condition would have been something to the effect of: ''If the dimensions of the
roadway described herein are sufficient to meet all then existing ordinances and requirements, including the
construction of roads, curbs, sidewalks, bonding, etc., then upon the completion of the construction of the roadway,
Grantee shall have the right to dedicate said road to the Ada County Highway District or such other governmental
agen<y then having jurisdiction and control over public roads and highways in Boise, Ada County, Idaho."
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was
evidence establishes that the parties intended for the
grantee and its successors to have the right to expand the road to meet ACHD's
specifications and requirements, and [2) the District Court erred by striking the
Arnold Aff., Connell Aff., and Second Sanderson Deel.

As illustrated above, the provisions of the Permanent Easement Agreement do not
conflict and there is no ambiguity at work However, should the Court deem otherwise it will
find that the extrinsic evidence confirms the contracting intent of Vancroft and Tee that the
easement road should be 40 feet wide until Vancroft or its successor chose to dedicate it to
ACHD, at which point the easement road would be naturally expanded to meet ACHD's
requirements.
A court may deem a contract ambiguous where it determines that the contract contains
conflicting or inconsistent provisions.

Madrid at 806, 10 P 3d at

The standard for

identifying ambiguity is a high one: "For a contract term to be ambiguous, there must be at least
two different reasonable interpretations of the term, or it must be nonsensical." Steel Farms, Inc.
v. Croft & Reed, Inc., 154 Idaho 259, 266, 297 P.3d 222, 229 (2012). "[W]here contractual

provisions are conflicting, the interpretation of the written contract and of the intent of the parties
is a matter for the trial judge's discretion." Haener v. Ada Cnty. Highway Dist., 108 Idaho 170,
173,697 P.2d 1184, 1187 (1985).
Typically, "[t]he parol evidence rule bars the use of extrinsic evidence when a court
interprets a written contract." AED, Inc. v. KDC Investments, LLC, 155 Idaho 159, 165, 307
P.3d I 76, 182 (2013). "Only when a document is ambiguous is parol evidence admissible to
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1

a

contract, the

primary goal must be to seek and give

the

parties at the time

the conveyance. See lvfarek v. Lawrence, 53 Idaho 50, 53, 278 P.3d 920,

to

923 (2012) (emphasis added) ("the court's primary goal [when considering parol evidence] is to
seek and give

to the real intention of the parties, which is determined according to the

language of the instrument and the circumstances surrounding the transaction."). See also, e.g.,
Porter v. Bassett, 146 Idaho 399, 404-05, 195 P.3d 1212, 1217-18 (2008); Commercial
Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M & Lynn Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208, 213, 177 P.3d 955, 960

(2008) ("The purpose of interpreting a contract is to determine the intent of the contracting
parties at the time the contract was entered.

Farnsworth v. Dairymen's Creamery Ass 'n, 125

Idaho 866,870,876 P.2d 148, 152 (Ct App. 1994); Straub, supra.
1. The parol evidence establishes that the parties intended for the grantee and

its successors to have the right to expand the road to meet ACHD's
specifications and requirements.
In this case, the most compelling evidence with respect to the intent of Tee and Vancroft
is the sworn statement of the actual drafter of the Permanent Easement Agreement, Rebecca
Arnold. See R. OOOI34-00017L In her affidavit, Ms. Arnold unequivocally confirms that Tee
and Vancroft always intended that whoever owned the dominant parcel (i.e., the Development
Parcel) would have the right to expand the easement road to meet ACHD's requirements and
then dedicate the road to ACHD. See R. 000135-000138. It is for this reason that the Permanent
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000172-000197), which
confirms that the parties advised BEI that they intended that the 40' width be temporary and
effective until such time as the owner of the Development Parcel decided to develop it. R.
000174-000175.
In addition, it is also uncontradicted that the City required the Developers to include
language in the Nibler Subdivision final plat which confirmed that access to the various parcels
of the Nibler Subdivision (including the Development Parcel) to 361h Street would be at the
discretion and to the standards of ACHD; not the City. Not only was the City aware that access
might be granted to 36th street, it expressly ceded authority over that issue to ACHD. R. 000173.
Because the best extrinsic evidence available to the Court reveals that Tee and Vancroft
so intended, Plaintiff requests that the Court grant PlaintifPs Motion and enter its judgment that
Plaintiff has the right to dedicate the easement road to ACHD and expand the road to meet
ACHD's requirements.
2. If this Court finds that the Permanent Easement Agreement is ambiguous,
then it should also find that the District Court erred by striking the Arnold
Aff., Connell Aff., and Second Sanderson Deel.
Of course the majority 11 of the foregoing extrinsic evidence was excluded by the District
Court.

11

R. 000675-000679.

The basis of the District Court's exclusion was the Court's

Notably, the District Court did not strike or otherwise exclude the Briggs Aff., nor did the City so request.
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conclusion that the Permanent Easement Agreement is not ambiguous.

See R.000675.
was

contracting
not relevant.

If, however, this Court deems that the Permanent Easement Agreement is ambiguous,
Buku

then parol evidence pertaining to the parties' contracting intent becomes relevant.

Properties, at 834, 291 P.3d at 1033. In such case, the District Court erred by excluding the
Arnold Aff., Connell Aff., and Second Sanderson Deel. from its consideration. 12

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, the above-named Plaintiffs-Appellants respectfully
request that this Court reverse the District Court's ruling and instruct the District Court to enter
its judgment in favor of Plaintiffs-Appellants as prayed for in Plaintiffs' FIRST AMENDED
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
DATED this 21st day of October, 2016.
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE, LLP
~

By: _ _..J./.'lt!!!l.~~~~~~---·
Terry C.
Attom

The District Court did not touch upon the Briggs Aff. in its Memorandum Decision Re: MSJ therefore it is unclear
whether the District Court excluded it If the District Court excluded the Briggs Aff. from its consideration, it erred
in doing so. The District Court likewise erred to the extent that it simply failed to consider the Briggs Aff. See, e.g.,
Trunnell v. Ferge!, 153 Idaho 68, 70, 278 P.3d 938, 940 (2012) (" . .it is the province of the trial court to weigh
conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the credibility of witnesses ... ")
12
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~rm
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants
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Abigail R. Germaine
Deputy City Attorneys
Boise City Attorney's Office
150 N. Capitol Blvd.
P.O. Box 500
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent
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